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tAbstract
This study investigates the causal impacts of integrating mobile phone technologies
into traditional public labor-market intermediation services on employment outcomes.
By providing faster, cheaper and up-to-date information on job vacancies via SMS,
mobile phone technologies might affect the rate at which offers arrive as well as
the probability of receiving a job offer. We implement a social experiment with
multiple treatments that allows us to investigate both the role of information channels
(digital versus non-digital) and information sets (restricted [public] versus unrestricted
[public/private]). The results show positive and significant short-term effects on
employment for public labor-market intermediation. While the impacts from traditional
labor-market intermediation are not large enough to be statistically significant,
the unrestricted digital treatment group shows statistically significant short-term
employment effects. As for potential matching efficiency gains, the results
suggest no statistically significant effects associated with either information
channels or information sets.
JEL classification codes: I3, J2
Keywords: Mobile phones; Labor-market intermediation; ICT; Field experiments; Peru1 Introduction
Information, though often costly or incomplete in reality, is central to the functioning
of markets (e.g., Stigler 1961). Economists have long emphasized that improvements in
information have the power to impact market performance and welfare, particularly in
developing settings where informational problems are seen as key barriers for growth
and development (e.g., Aker 2010). Labor market transactions are not an exception as
they are characterized by high levels of mismatch, coordination problems, and asym-
metric information affecting workers and firms alike (e.g., Autor 2001). Yet, traditional
labor-market intermediaries (LMIs), such as public employment offices and temporary
help agencies, which aim to reduce search costs and adverse selection problems, re-
main understudied in both developed and developing settings (Autor 2009).
The unprecedented expansion of Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT) in the last two decades has invigorated research in this area motivated by the
emergence of a new array of LMIs, such as online job boards, social media sites, and
e-recruiting firms. Evidence, largely based on U.S. data, has shown how the diffusion2015 Dammert et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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2009, Bagues and Sylos 2009), leading to a reallocation of job search effort (Stevenson
2009, Kuhn and Mansour 2011) and more diversified search behavior (Kroft and Pope
2009, Cahuc and Fontaine 2009).
While this promising research has addressed the impacts of Internet access on search
behavior and unemployment spells, nothing is yet known about the role of mobile
phone technologies on the efficiency of the labor markets. The aim of this study is to
provide evidence, analysis and insights on the causal impacts of (digital) public labor-
market intermediation in a developing-country setting. Despite its importance, there is
essentially no empirical evidence thus far on the impacts of mobile phone technologies
on labor-market outcomes.
A distinctive feature of this study is its experimental design. We use as a case study
the public LMI system in Peru, a country that adopted an innovative e-government ini-
tiative in labor intermediation1. We implement a social experiment with multiple treat-
ments as part of regular (non-experimental) public labor intermediation services. From
June 22, 2009 to September 1, 2009, the experimental sample was selected at the initial
registration filing for the normal inflow of applicants into Lima. Jobseekers that signed
up to receive public labor-market intermediation were randomly assigned to four treat-
ment groups according to two information channels (i.e., digital and non-digital inter-
mediation) and the scope of information they received (i.e., restricted [public] and
unrestricted [public/private] information sets). The restricted set only considers SMS
messages regarding job positions from firms that have registered within the public LMI
system in Peru, while the unrestricted one considers SMS messages regarding job posi-
tions from firms inside and outside the LMI system (e.g., firms advertising job positions
in newspapers).
This study addresses four specific and related topics of interest. First, we exploit
unique data to analyze the determinants of digital job search in Peru by considering
both Internet and mobile-phone channels. Second, we evaluate the overall effectiveness
of public LMI on reducing unemployment spells and improving the match quality of
workers to jobs. Evidence in this area is mixed, highly dependent on the research design
and corresponds mainly to developed countries (e.g., Bishop 1993, Ashenfelter et al.
2005, Meyer 1995). Third, we compare the effectiveness of digital versus non-digital
labor market intermediation within the public system. Finally, we analyze whether it is
the technology or the set of information available to jobseekers that matters most. We
then compare the impacts of restricted versus unrestricted information sets while hold-
ing fixed the information technology.
From a theoretical standpoint, the improvement of access to information via mobile
phone service might affect the efficiency of labor market intermediation through sev-
eral channels. Economic theory predicts that the larger the cost of search, the less ex-
tensive will be the searches undertaken by workers at a given wage distribution (e.g.,
Stigler 1962, Mortensen 1986). A direct effect of introducing mobile phones in labor
market intermediation is a direct fall in search costs as workers can access relevant,
up-to-date information on job vacancies via SMS. Standard search models predict that
both the rate at which offers arrive and the probability of receiving a job offer will
increase as a result of search costs decreasing. A second channel through which im-
proved information via mobile phones affects the labor markets is via better arbitrage
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and Stigler 1976). Information is, after all, capital that is produced at the lower cost of
search and, thus, yields higher returns than what would have been received in its absence.
A third channel is by better matching workers to jobs due to enhancements in search and
coordination tasks (Aker and Mbiti 2010).
At the same time, some countervailing factors might affect the relevance of mobile
phone service in labor-market intermediation. The rise in the number of potential
matches because of reduced search costs would increase the minimum wage a worker
will accept or the minimum productivity an employer will accept (Pissarides 2000,
Boone and van Ours 2004). Moreover, the fall in search costs may also lead to a fall in
match quality due to an excess of applications of unemployed people who belong to
groups with chronic problems of employability (Autor 2001), or the emergence of
crowding-out effects from traditional search methods. In the Appendix, we present for
illustration purposes a theoretical model with endogenous search effort in both public
and private search channels that shows uncertain effects of technology-driven search
efficiency improvement on unemployment spells. The uncertainty emerges because pa-
tient jobseekers could wait for a better wage offer or because of crowding-out effects in
the alternative private search channel. In all, the net effect of integrating mobile phone
technologies into labor-market intermediation is an empirical question that depends on
the relative strengths of these channels.
The main result shows positive and significant short-term effects on employment for
public labor-market intermediation. The smallest effects are associated with traditional,
non-digital intermediation, while the largest effects are associated to unrestricted SMS
intermediation. However, these treatment group differences are not sufficiently large to
be statistically detected. From a policy standpoint, this research shows the feasibility
and value of integrating new information technologies into traditional public labor-
market intermediation services.
This study speaks directly to the recent literature on digital technologies and economic
development that is largely based on observational data for developed countries. By provid-
ing the first experimental evidence on the role of mobile phone technologies in connecting
workers to jobs, we contribute to the understanding of how the new ‘information economy’
(Freeman 2002) is shaping new labor-market institutions in developing countries. Our find-
ings contribute to an emerging body of work that reports how mobile phone services have
brought new possibilities for economic development in agriculture (e.g., Aker and
Fafchamps 2013, Goyal 2010), health (e.g., Dammert et al. 2014, Pop-Eleches et al.
2011), financial (e.g., Karlan et al. 2010), and fishing markets (e.g., Jensen 2007).
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a background discussion about
the public intermediation system in Peru; section 3 discusses the research design, treat-
ment and treatment groups; section 4 analyzes the data and the baseline equivalence;
section 5 analyzes the determinants of digital job search; section 6 reports the empirical
results; and section 7 concludes.2 Background: public employment services in Peru
Prior to 1996, the Peruvian Public Employment Services operated as a centralized inter-
mediation office, hosted at the headquarters and regional branches of the Ministry of
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employee matching process was highly bureaucratic and done manually case-by-case
without any regard for the automatization of the data collection and dissemination of the
information. Not surprisingly, the job intermediation process was inefficient and costly.
The average time it took for a worker to complete the registration process was 4 days after
completing a battery of aptitude, knowledge, and psychometric tests (MTPS 1998). As a
result, only 3 percent of active jobseekers used the public employment services in 1996,
and in particular, they were those with chronic problems of employability (Chacaltana and
Sulmont 2003)2.
In 1996, the Peruvian government launched an ambitious e-government initiative
aimed to modernize the role of the public employment agencies. With technical and fi-
nancial support from the Swiss government and the European Union, a new National
Information System (SIL) was put into place to support the adoption and design of e-
government procedures, lower the administrative burden, and to improve the efficiency
of the intermediation process. Bureaucratic processes were replaced by simpler and
time-saving protocols, the compilation and dissemination of information changed from
manual to automated matching algorithms, centralized labor-market institutions were
replaced with decentralized offices through partnerships with not-for-profit institutions
such as NGOs and vocational schools, and more caseworkers were hired and trained in
labor-market intermediation (MTPS 1998, 1999).
This active labor-market initiative started its operations in 1998 with the introduction
of CIL-PROEMPLEO, an LMI institution that offers intermediation services. Bureau-
cratic practices were greatly simplified as participation only requires individuals and
firms to register in-person at any labor mediation office by filling a simple application
form and answering a short standard labor-market survey3. This information is subse-
quently uploaded to SILNET, a customized informatics system of job intermediation avail-
able only through an intranet. SILNET has simplified enormously the search costs in time
and effort for both firms and workers. The registration process, for instance, went from
4 days prior to 1998 to less than an hour (MTPS 1999). The computer software analyzes
and matches workers’ skills and experience with job openings. Once a suitable match is
found, the jobseeker is contacted in person (or in some cases, by telephone or e-mail if
available), in order to pick-up a letter of presentation from the Ministry of Labor with de-
tails about the job vacancy. It is worth noticing that job matches are based only on job op-
portunities generated from firms that have previously signed up on CIL-PROEMPLEO.
Unlike other experiences, particularly in developed countries, participation in these ser-
vices is voluntary given the absence of an unemployment insurance system in Peru.
Two years after the implementation of CIL-PROEMPLEO, the number of interme-
diated workers significantly increased. While in 1996, the total number of employee-
employer intermediation was 10,275 at the national level, it jumped to 22,764 in 1998.
The corresponding numbers for metropolitan Lima, which represents more than 55
percent of the total intermediation, were 7,914 and 12,682, respectively (MTPS 1999).
All in all, the number of unemployed persons using the public intermediation system
has increased significantly in the past decade from three percent in 1997 to 14 percent
in 2007. Likewise, the number of job vacancies that has been offered through the public
system has increased by five times from 12,707 in 1997 to 66,691 in 2007. According to
administrative data, the average cost for each intermediated worker reaches US$ 25,
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vate employment agencies (MTPS 1998)4.
Administrative data also shows that the effective rate of intermediation was quite
steady over time. As a percentage of applicants, CIL-PROEMPLEO was able to inter-
mediate one-out-of-four workers, with small variations over time. As a percentage of
the number of job vacancies, there is more variability ranging from 60 to 80 percent
between 1998 and 2007. One potential explanation for this flattened profile is the rela-
tively small number of job vacancies that are still advertised via the public intermedi-
ation system. Indeed, only 15 percent of firms located in metropolitan Lima were
registered with CIL-PROEMPLEO in 2004 (Vera 2006).
A second wave of reforms in the operation of the Peruvian public intermediation sys-
tem occurred in 2004 when the online version of CIL-PROEMPLEO started its operation
in an effort to expand the adoption of information and communication technologies in
the labor market5. In practice, this e-government innovation allows all registered jobsee-
kers and firms online access to CIL-PROEMPLEO services, provided they have access to
the Internet6. The main attribute of this online service is that workers and firms can up-
load their information and exchange suitable matches without the intervention of any
caseworker. In 2005, one year after the full operation of this electronic version, 59,137
people used the online version along with more than 5,000 firms that offered 32,000 job
vacancies (MTPS 2006). There is no available data, however, on the rate of labor inter-
mediation for this component as firms and workers exchange.3 Research design, treatment, and treatment groups
A primary concern in the literature of labor-market intermediation is the role of ‘selection
on unobservables’ which has plagued non-experimental empirical studies (e.g., Meyer
1995, Kuhn and Skuterud 2004). In this setting, adverse selection is a key issue since pub-
lic employment services seem to be populated with unemployed individuals with chronic
problems of employability (e.g., Autor 2001 and Thomas 1997)7. A distinctive feature of
this study is its experimental design with multiple treatments that minimize considerable
empirical difficulties associated with both self-selection in labor intermediation and the
endogenous placement of mobile phones. Early in 2009, we signed a formal agreement of
cooperation with the Ministry of Labor and Social Promotion, which allowed us access, in
real time, to the SILNET intranet system. The field experiment was implemented as part
of the regular (non-experimental) public intermediation services, which affords two main
advantages. The experimental sample is composed by new registered users of the public
employment system, which greatly minimizes ‘selection on unobservables’ issues. Simi-
larly, regardless of the treatment group assignment, all individuals in our sample were
chosen randomly, and they did not self-select to be part of the experimental sample.
On the other hand, due to institutional restrictions we were only allowed to leave the
control group individuals out of public intermediation for three months after registration
in the LMI system, and thus, we were only able to measure short-run treatment effects.
Starting in the fourth month, all individuals, regardless of their treatment status, were sub-
ject to the standard non-digital labor market intermediation. This particular feature will
have consequences for the magnitude and interpretation of the results we analyze in
section 6.
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days) from June 22, 2009 to September 1, 2009, among new registered users to CIL-
PROEMPLEO. The experimental sample was selected at the initial registration filing
for the normal inflow of applicants in Lima after excluding registered individuals who
do not own mobile phones or hold occupations with very high turnover rates; i.e., un-
skilled persons. Table 1 describes the main features of the treatment design. Each day,
among the set of new applicants, we randomly assigned jobseekers into three different
groups: non-digital treatment group, digital treatment group, and control group, follow-
ing a random allocation of 30, 40, and 30 percent, respectively. The individual-level
randomization protocol did not consider stratification on specific baseline characteris-
tics due to the (daily) small samples. Registered individuals remained in the same treat-
ment groups throughout the life of this intervention.
The non-digital treatment group was subject to the standard CIL-PROEMPLEO
intermediation practices. The treatment consisted of three months of subsidized job
search assistance in which individuals’ labor profiles were matched with available job
vacancies8. To avoid any disruption (or caseworker bias) the names of selected mem-
bers in this group were not revealed to case workers. In contrast to this treatment
group, the digital treatment group was exposed to technological innovation aimed at
reducing job search costs. Jobseekers assigned to this group were informed about job-
market opportunities that match their labor profile through digital services; i.e., delivery
of SMS messages to their mobile phones. The difference between traditional and digital
treatment groups is that the former is mainly contacted in-person (or, by phone) fol-
lowing the standard protocols from CIL-PROEMPLEO, while the latter is electronically
contacted via text messages. There is no other salient difference between these treat-
ments as the regular counselor-based and mobile phone-based intermediation services
follow the same protocols.
It is worth mentioning that the experimental design provided evidence only on subsi-
dized job search assistance and does not imposed elements of job search requirements,
i.e., enforcement and verification, because of the absence of an unemployment insurance
system in Peru. In other studies that combine both aspects, it is more challenging to iden-
tify what aspects of the experiments induced the change in outcomes (Meyer 1995, Black
et al. 2003, Ashenfelter et al. 2005). Finally, control group individuals were removed tem-
porarily from the information system for only a period of three months.Table 1 Experimental design
Traditional treatment Digital treatment Control
(DT1) Restricted- Unrestricted- (DC)
SMS (DT2) SMS (DT3)
Random
allocation
30% 13% 27% 30%
Treatment
intervention
Three months of labor-
market intermediation
Three months of labor-
market intermediation
Three months of labor-
market intermediation
None
Information
channel
No digital SMS SMS None
Information
sets
Only public sources Only public sources Public and private sources None
Sample size 345 188 303 354
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intermediated only with job vacancies from firms that signed up through the public inter-
mediation system. This attribute could be inefficient as the majority of job vacancies in
Lima are advertised through alternative channels such as newspaper ads, job boards or
private employment agencies (Vera 2006)9. Therefore, to test whether it is the technology
by itself or the set of information available to jobseekers that matters most, we implement
a second set of randomization that manipulates the number of jobs on which information
is available. Within the digital treatment group, individuals were randomly assigned into
two different groups—the restricted-SMS treatment group and the unrestricted-SMS
treatment group—following an allocation ratio of 1:1.5. The former is matched only with
job-opportunities generated within the CIL-PROEMPLEO system, i.e., the public informa-
tion set, while the latter is matched with both CIL-PROEMPLEO vacancies as well as job
opportunities posted on alternative channels such as national newspapers ads and not-for-
profit private employment agencies, i.e., public/private information sets. The comparison
of these two treatment groups allows one to test the impact of expanding the set of infor-
mation available to jobseekers while holding fixed the information technology.
Given the inclusion of additional information sources for the unrestricted-SMS group,
the frequency of information (number of SMS messages) is expected to be higher for this
group relative to the restricted-SMS treatment group. Otherwise, there is no difference in
the content, wording and format of the SMS messages between both digital groups. Thus,
independently of whether individuals belong to the restricted- or unrestricted-SMS treat-
ment groups, the framing of the information sent to jobseekers via SMS follows a standard
structure and is limited to the description of the occupation and contact information10.
In total, 1,280 individuals were randomly assigned from June 22 to September 1, 2009
to four different groups, of which 354 corresponded to the control group (Dc), 344 to the
standard non-digital treatment group (DT1), 188 to the restricted-SMS group (DT2) and
303 to the unrestricted-SMS treatment group (DT3). By comparing the treatment impacts
across these different experimental groups, we are able to evaluate the overall impact of
CIL-PROEMPLEO on the employment status of registered participants, evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of adopting digital technology (i.e., SMS) in labor-market intermediation, and
test the impact of expanding the set of information available to jobseekers while holding
fixed the information technology.4 Data and baseline equivalence
Baseline and follow-up information were collected following standard labor-market surveys.
The former contain information for 1,189 individuals, which implies an attrition rate of 7
percent relative to the original sampling design. The low rate of attrition was similar in all
treatment groups, and it is not statistically related to any particular socio-demographic vari-
able11. This feature adds to the quality of the dataset used in this study since attrition bias is
common in these types of settings. The follow-up dataset was collected right after the inter-
vention ended. Since assignment into the program lasted from June 22 to September 1,
2009, the follow-up questionnaire and field work were carefully assembled to align the in-
formation from all individuals to the same time reference (i.e., 3 months after assignment).
All 1,189 individuals who provided information in the baseline period were also able to par-
ticipate in the follow-up survey.
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fectiveness of randomization in balancing the distribution of covariates across all
treatment groups. Table 2 depicts baseline socio-demographic and labor-market infor-
mation for all experimental groups, following a customized survey implemented right
after the registration process. Columns 1 to 4 show descriptive statistics for each one
of the four experimental groups, while columns 5 and 6 show the p-values for the
t-test (treatment versus control) and the F-test of equality of means across all four ex-
perimental groups.
Panel A shows that the average individual in our sample has completed high-school
education, is younger than 30 years old, and single. There is a slight disproportion in
the rate of enrollment by gender, as 55 percent of registered users are men. Only 30
percent of users have offspring, which indicates the average user of the public inter-
mediation is relatively young. Moreover, an analysis of household indicators reveal that
the average individual in this data has access to basic infrastructure and own household
assets. The p-values for all variables, except for age, do not reject the null hypothesis of
the equality of means across all experimental groups.
Panel B reports basic statistics for a rich set of baseline labor-market characteristics.
The unemployment spells for all groups is statistically balanced (94 days), which consti-
tutes an important piece of information since the reliability of several non-
experimental studies in this area has been questioned because they exploited only vari-
ation of intermediation usage without controlling for the timing and duration of the
unemployment spell (see for instance Thomas 1997). Moreover, 80 percent of the sam-
ple has previous job experience, mainly in the private sector, while 12 percent are con-
sidered as a discouraged worker. For those working at baseline, the average monthly
income is 656 soles. Around one fifth of the sample had fringe benefits including health
insurance and pension plans, while 50 percent worked as white-collar workers. Similar
job characteristics are found for those who did not work at baseline but had worked in
the past. Most important, the p-values of the F-test for the equality of means are above
0.05 for all variables except for the share of people who had worked under formal
contracts.
Panel C reports novel information on ICT usage and job search strategies among job-
seekers participating in public labor-market intermediation. The average number of
search methods used by the sample is close to two. We find that 96 percent of the sam-
ple regularly use mobile phones, while 49 percent do so for job search purposes, and in
particular, to contact prospective employers (57 percent), private (26 percent) and pub-
lic (11 percent) labor-market intermediaries. Further, 84 percent of the sample has ex-
perience using the Internet, which is a relatively high percentage with respect to the
population. Sixty-one percent of the sample used the Internet for job search purposes.
Importantly, 4 out of 5 Internet-based searchers access the Internet from Internet café
shops, where for a small amount of money they can rent computers with online access.
Only 25 percent of the sample access Internet from home. Moreover, the data show
that, on average, our sample spent 0.9 hours-per-week on public search channels,
which accounts for only 20 percent of the total weekly search time. This means that
job search in Peru is mainly done outside of the public intermediation system since the
weekly (average) number of hours devoted to active job search is 4.5. The p-value of
the F-test for the equality of means does not reject the equality of means for all ICT-
Table 2 Summary statistics by treatment status. Digital Labor-market Intermediation
Program, Lima 2009-2010
Treatment groups
Non-digital T1 Digital T2 Digital T3 Control p-value
of t-test
p-value
of F test
Baseline variables DT1 DT2 DT3 Dc Treatment =
Control
[DT1 = DT2 =
DT3 = DC]
A. Socio-demographic
Sex (1 = male) 0.57 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.62 0.65
Age 27.04 25.33 26.27 25.55 0.01 0.01
Years of schooling 12.15 12.09 12.06 11.94 0.36 0.36
Single 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.82 0.46
Have children 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.14 0.22
Number of children 0.55 0.39 0.55 0.45 0.24 0.12
Migrant 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.48 0.75
Access to flush toilet 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.11 0.29
Access to safe water 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.40 0.39
Poverty index 0.06 −0.01 −0.02 0.03 0.68 0.64
B. Labor-market experience
Worked ever 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.91 0.97
Discouraged worker 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.85 0.85
Unemployment duration (days) 75 105 104 99 0.60 0.22
Characteristics of job at baseline
Monthly income (in soles) 604 688 689 650 0.81 0.24
Had formal contract 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.84 0.79
White-collar worker 0.55 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.42
Had health insurance 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.50
Had pension plan 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.32 0.68
Characteristics of last job
Monthly income (in soles) 659 664 691 729 0.28 0.70
Had formal contract 0.49 0.60 0.67 0.54 0.28 0.01
White-collar worker 0.65 0.76 0.69 0.74 0.25 0.20
Had health insurance 0.28 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.46 0.39
Had pension plan 0.29 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.70 0.49
C. Digital technologies and job search
Number of search methods 1.69 1.56 1.68 1.67 0.90 0.72
Number of hours-week
job search
5.68 5.18 5.48 5.68 0.63 0.79
Number of hours-week
in public channels
0.77 1.01 0.80 0.82 0.90 0.65
Number of hours-week
in private channels
4.90 4.01 4.67 4.84 0.52 0.28
Use cell phone 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.14 0.43
Use cell phone for job search 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.37 0.79
Cell phone to contact
prospective employers
0.55 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.39 0.83
Cell phone to contact
public LMIs
0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.74 0.65
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Table 2 Summary statistics by treatment status. Digital Labor-market Intermediation
Program, Lima 2009-2010 (Continued)
Cell phone to contact
private LMIs
0.27 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.47 0.85
Use internet 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.98 0.86
Use internet for job search 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.91
Access internet from home 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.30
Access internet from
internet cafes
0.74 0.70 0.74 0.79 0.13 0.35
Access internet from work 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.83 0.62
N 345 188 303 354
Notes: The test of equal means for the experimental sample is based on a regression with treatment indicators on the
right-hand side. DT1 refers to the traditional treatment group, DT2 to the restricted-SMS treatment group, DT3 to the
unrestricted-SMS treatment group, and Dc to the control group. Labor-market characteristics of job at baseline and last
job are calculated conditional on employment status.
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tially have the same access to the Internet version of the CIL-PROEMPLEO labor-
market intermediation program.
In sum, the statistical analyses performed on a large set of personal and household
covariates suggest that the sample of individuals assigned to all different groups were
drawn from the same population. There are some few variables, however, that show
some differences among the treatment groups. We therefore control for baseline covar-
iates in the regression results.
We use the 2007 wave of the Peruvian household survey, Encuesta Nacional de
Hogares (ENAHO), conducted yearly by Peru’s national statistical agency, the Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica to compare differences with respect to our
experimental sample. We do not observe striking differences in socio-demographic
and economic characteristics between these two populations. We observe that the
CIL-PROEMPLEO experimental units are somewhat younger, more educated, and
have somewhat better economic status relative to the general unemployed popula-
tion. Yet, there is one exception to this assessment: the unemployment spell
duration is quite different for these two populations. While the general population
report 3.38 weeks of unemployment, participants in the CIL-PROEMPLEO
program report 13.42 weeks. This large difference is in line with international
evidence that reports that public employment services are disproportionally populated
with unemployed individuals with chronic problems of employability (e.g., Autor 2001
and Thomas 1997)12.5 Determinants of digital job search in Peru
In this section, we use the baseline information to assess the determinants of digital
labor-market intermediation for our sample of jobseekers irrespective of their treatment
assignment. This analysis sheds light on the role of socio-demographic and labor-
market characteristics on influencing digital job search, the relationship between Internet
and mobile-phone job search channels, and how previous exposure to digital technology
affects current digital job search.
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of digital job search conditional on a rich set of covariates. Each column corresponds
to a different outcome of interest. In column 1, the dependent variable takes the value
1 for those individuals who have used either Internet or mobile phones for job search
purposes, 0 otherwise, while columns 2 and 3 considers Internet and mobile phone job
search channels separately. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
By looking at Panel A in column 1, one is tempted to conclude that individuals’
socio-demographic characteristics seem to play no role on the likelihood of (overall)
digital job search in metropolitan Lima since no variable is statistically significant at the
5 percent level. Yet, a closer look at columns 2 and 3 reveals that indeed some personal
characteristics matter depending on the specific digital channel used. Two variables
emerge as statistically significant predictors for Internet job search: presence of off-
spring and poverty status, the former possibly associated with spillover effects from
children’s exposure to Internet at schools and the latter associated with barriers to
technology access due to income constrains. In fact, column 2 shows that the likelihood
of using the Internet for job search purposes is almost 15 percentage points lower for
poor households than that for non-poor ones and 19 percentage points higher for indi-
viduals with offspring relative to those without them. The positive relationship between
Internet job search and income is in line with international evidence for developed
countries (e.g., Stevenson 2009). Column 3, on the other hand, shows that gender,
schooling attainment, poverty and migration status of jobseekers matters for mobile
phone job search channel. Men are 10 percentage points more likely to search for jobs
using mobile phones than are women, and an extra year of schooling is associated with
1.6 higher percentage points for mobile-phone job search. Likewise, the poor (and mi-
grants) are 14 (and 9) percentage points more likely than non-poor (non-migrants) to
use mobile phones during the job search process. Overall, these results suggest that
poverty status is the main factor that differentiates the use of mobile phones from the
Internet when selecting a job search channel. From a policy perspective, this result
highlights the importance of mobile phones for vulnerable populations that cannot ac-
cess the Internet in developing countries due to income barriers.
By turning our attention to Panel B, one observes that job seekers who have previous job
experience and are optimistic about future job-market prospects are disproportionally
more likely to use both Internet and mobile phone channels for job search purposes. Those
who had never worked show a 30-percentage point lower probability of using digital job
search compared to those with previous job experience, while jobseekers that are optimistic
about the probability of finding a job in the near future are 16 percentage points more
likely to search for jobs using digital technologies. The former result suggests that past
labor-market experiences have made workers more aware of the possibilities of digital tech-
nologies, while the latter suggests a virtuous circle between digital labor-market intermedi-
ation and job gain expectations in developing settings (Dammert et al. 2013). Finally, no
other labor-market variable, such as the type of worker or job-quality attributes, matters.
In Panels C and D, one observes how past exposure to the Internet and mobile
phones affects the likelihood of using them for job search purposes. The results show
that digital experience does not matter for mobile phones searchers. In fact, having
computer and Internet literacy or owning a mobile phone for a few months, three or
more than five years, does not make any difference in the usage of mobile phones for
Table 3 Determinants of digital job search, probit marginal estimates (baseline data).
Labor-market Intermediation Program, Lima 2009–2010
Marginal effects
Digital internet +
cell phones
Internet Cell phones
A. Socio-demographic characteristics
Gender (1 = men, 0 = women) 0.023 −0.026 0.097***
(0.028) (0.036) (0.032)
Age −0.003 0.000 −0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Single 0.032 0.064 −0.038
(0.047) (0.063) (0.053)
Has children 0.105* 0.188** −0.006
(0.058) (0.081) (0.076)
Number of children −0.028 −0.076* −0.000
(0.029) (0.041) (0.036)
Migrant 0.065 0.062 0.087*
(0.043) (0.061) (0.053)
Years from migration −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of schooling 0.007 0.004 0.016**
(0.048) (0.007) (0.006)
Poor 0.007 −0.145** 0.141***
(0.048) (0.063) (0.054)
Less poor −0.036 −0.095* 0.066
(0.041) (0.052) (0.047)
B. Labor-market characteristics
Worked under formal contract 0.021 0.038 −0.014
(0.038) (0.050) (0.043)
Had pension plan 0.084 0.048 0.006
(0.071) (0.101) (0.089)
Had health insurance 0.007 0.077 0.023
(0.078) (0.095) (0.088)
Worked as blue-collar −0.009 0.000 −0.011
(0.035) (0.047) (0.039)
Never work −0.283*** −0.134** −0.293***
(0.047) (0.054) (0.042)
Job gain expectations (1 = high, 0 = otherwise) 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.075**
(0.031) (0.038) (0.034)
C. Cell phones experience
Up to one year 0.097** 0.105* 0.097*
(0.036) (0.054) (0.050)
Between one and three years 0.043 0.023 0.025
(0.029) (0.039) (0.036)
D. Internet experience
Has computer at home 0.279*** 0.521*** −0.124
(0.032) (0.033) (0.084)
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Table 3 Determinants of digital job search, probit marginal estimates (baseline data).
Labor-market Intermediation Program, Lima 2009–2010 (Continued)
Use computer less than three years 0.005 0.148** −0.092
(0.060) (0.067) (0.069)
Use computer between three and five years −0.031 0.046 −0.053
(0.063) (0.072) (0.071)
Use computer more than 5 years 0.117** 0.220*** −0.010
(0.052) (0.063) (0.070)
Internet café in the neighborhood 0.331*** 0.688*** −0.066
(0.073) (0.055) (0.081)
Internet café one block away from neighborhood 0.095** 0.062 0.067
(0.040) (0.052) (0.051)
Internet café one to three blocks away from neighborhood 0.016 0.005 0.021
(0.043) (0.053) (0.053)
Internet café is 12 to 24 months old 0.007 0.086 −0.083
(0.063) (0.070) (0.070)
Internet café is more than 24 months old −0.029 0.032 0.007
(0.047) (0.057) (0.053)
E. Search channels
Cell phone job search ——— 0.349*** ————
——— (0.033) ————
Internet job search ——— ——— 0.393***
——— ——— (0.035)
N 1188 1188 1188
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects from probit estimates using baseline data. The ‘digital’ outcome is
defined as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for those who use Internet or cell phones for job search activities,
0 otherwise. ***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%.
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the availability of a computer at home (likelihood increases by 52 percentage points),
length of computer experience (22 percentage point increase for those who have used a
computer for more than five years), and the existence of Internet cafe shops in the
neighborhood (69 percentage points). Evidence on the first two variables is not surpris-
ing and it is in line with findings from other studies that are based on data from devel-
oped countries (e.g., Stevenson 2009, Autor 2001). The last variable, however, provides
new insights on the growing importance of Internet cafes in developing settings. This
type of business has blossomed in recent years, although its impacts on the market-
place are practically unknown. From a policy perspective, this result suggests that pro-
viding incentives for the expansion of this type of small business might improve the
efficiency of the labor markets in developing countries.
Finally, Panel E shows a positive correlation between Internet and mobile-phone
search channels. The likelihood of using cell phones for job search purposes is 40 per-
centage points higher for individuals who use the Internet for job search relative to
those who do not, while it reaches 35 percent in the other direction.
In sum, this section has uncovered evidence on key covariates that affect the access
and usage of digital job search channels in Peru. Poverty and the lack of availability of
Internet cafes seems to be the main barriers for Internet-based job search, while the
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tions on job gain prospects are positively related to this activity. The use of mobile
phones for job search purposes, on the other hand, seems to be more idiosyncratic with
respect to Internet-based search, although it is clear that disadvantaged men and mi-
grant individuals are more prone to use it. Only two variables have a consistent positive
effect for both digital channels: labor-market experience and job gain expectations, var-
iables that are usually overlooked in the analysis of digital job-search channels.
6 Empirical framework and results
To estimate the overall effectiveness of public labor intermediation in Peru we implement
a standard parametric OLS regression for individual i in experimental (day) group j,
Y ij ¼ β0 þ β1Di þ Xij0β2 þ ηj þ εij; ð1Þ
where Yij is the particular outcome of interest (employment), Di denotes a treatment
indicator that receives 1 for all individuals subject to labor intermediation independ-
ently of the information channel and information set they were assigned, 0 for those in
the control group. Xij denotes a set of socio-demographic and labor-market baseline co-
variates, while εij is the error term. Given that we have as many experimental sets as
the different days that the experimental sampling lasted, we incorporate experimental
group (date) fixed effects, ηj, to control for intra-day variation in the treatment alloca-
tion. The coefficient of interest is β1 and represents an intent-to-treat parameter. The
main outcome of interest is employment in the month of reference. In our context, re-
gression analysis is motivated by the availability of a rich set of baseline covariates that
could reduce the size of the standard errors for the point estimates, the need to incorpor-
ate clustered standard errors due to intra-day variation in the random allocation, and a
multiple treatment design that can be incorporated smoothly within this framework13.
To evaluate the effectiveness of adopting digital technology in labor-market inter-
mediation along with varying sets of information available to jobseekers, we expand
equation (1) and implement the following complementary model,
Y ij ¼ β0 þ β1DiT 1 þ β2DiT2 þ β3DiT3 þ Xij0β4 þ ηj þ εij; ð2Þ
where Di
T1,Di
T2 and Di
T3 denote treatment indicators for the traditional, restricted-SMS, and unrestricted-SMS treatment groups, respectively. The base category is the
control group. The coefficients β1, β2, and β3 represent intent-to-treat parameters of
interest. By comparing the magnitude and significance of β1 and β2, we are able to test
the impacts of digital intermediation holding fixed the set of information, while by
comparing β2 and β3 we test the impacts of expanding the set of information while
holding fixed the information technology. Given the 3-month treatment duration, the
follow-up survey asks individuals to respond on their employment status each month
after assignment to treatment. Thus, we report three different estimates corresponding
to the first, second and third month following the treatment assignment.
6.1 Main results
Table 4 reports the OLS short-run impacts of public labor-market intermediation on
employment status one, two and three months following the intervention. The upper
Table 4 Labor market intermediation on employment outcome. Labor-Market
Intermediation Program, Lima 2009-2010
Month # 1 Month # 2 Month # 3
Dep variable: employment
Overall treatment 0.066** 0.062** 0.056* 0.055* 0.003 −0.002
(0.032) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
Type of treatment
Traditional treatment (DT1) 0.041 0.034 0.046 0.040 −0.018 −0.034
(0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.044)
Restricted-SMS treatment (DT2) 0.081* 0.083* 0.057 0.060 0.034 0.034
(0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Unrestricted-SMS treatment (DT3) 0.086** 0.081** 0.067* 0.069* 0.008 0.008
(0.040) (0.032) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035)
p-value of F-test: DT1 = DT2 = DT3 0.478 0.381 0.876 0.712 0.493 0.334
N 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Experimental groups FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errrors in parenthesis. Estimates based on a parametric cross-sectional estimator. The treatment indicator
takes the value 1 for those benefiting from labor-market intermediation, 0 otherwise. Socio-demographic covariates include
age, gender, marital status, poverty index, whether individual has children, number of children, whether individual is migrant,
number of years since migration, years of schooling. Labor-market covariates include whether individual had ever worked,
whether individual had pension plan, health insurance, accident insurance, formal contract as well as blue-collar and white-collar
worker indicators. Clustered standard errors by day are considered when including experimental groups fixed effects in columns
2, 4, and 6. ***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%.
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Clustered standard errors by date are shown in parentheses. Results indicate that public
labor-market intermediation has positive and significant employment impacts within
the first month of the intervention. These effects are somewhat above 6 percentage
points and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the first month following
labor-market intermediation14. This impact equals a 17 percent increase with respect
to the baseline mean outcome. A comparison of columns 1 and 2 shows that these
positive effects are robust to the inclusion of a rich set of baseline covariates and ex-
perimental groups fixed effects, which is expected given that randomization at the indi-
vidual level has led the balance of baseline covariates between the treatment and
control group individuals as shown in Table 2.
The magnitude and statistical significance of the impacts, however, lessens two and
three months after treatment. Columns 3 to 6 show that the magnitude of the treat-
ment effects reaches 5.5 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 10 per-
cent level two months following the intervention. For the third month, no statistically
significant impacts are observed. Two features related to this intervention might ex-
plain this profile for the employment impacts. First, we are facing a short-term inter-
vention since control group individuals were left out of treatment for only three
months, and thus everyone in the sample, irrespective of the random assignment, was
subject to the same standard non-digital labor-market intermediation beginning the
fourth month. Unlike other labor-market interventions (e.g., training) that might have
long-lasting effects due to human capital accumulation, the potential impacts of this
(information-only) labor-market intermediation mainly happens during the treatment
period. Second, in general, users of the public labor-market intermediation are
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and Thomas 1997). Thus, it is possible that those who were not able to get a job during
the first two months after the start of the intervention have the least attachment to the
labor market. Indeed, Figure 1 shows the work outcome profile for all treatment groups
from month zero (baseline) to month 3. One can observe that both digital treatment
groups show the steepest slope from baseline to the first month of intervention. After
the first month, the slope flattens out sharply. On the other hand, the profile for the
control group individuals shows a linear profile with smaller but consistent gains from
baseline up until the third month of the intervention. Since attachment to the labor
market is balanced at baseline for all treatment groups, it implies that it is just a matter
of time for individuals in the control group to catch-up those individuals in the treat-
ment groups since the value of information become less relevant over time for individ-
uals with weaker labor market attachments. In fact, the analysis of heterogeneous
impacts presented in next section shows evidence that information has differential ef-
fects depending on the labor-market attachment of jobseekers.
An alternative explanation to interpret these diminishing effects over time is the po-
tential existence of spillover effects as jobseekers could meet in the local offices and
share information with each other regarding the treatment. Indeed, the sample of un-
employed job seekers has reduced by month three for both treatment and control
groups. This spillover possibility, however, is unlikely particularly in a big city such as
Lima where the (crowded) local offices of the Ministry of Labor receive hundreds of
people throughout the day and are without the facilities to enable this type of informa-
tion exchange.Notes: DT1, DT2, and DT3 stand for traditional treatment group, restricted-SMS
treatment group, and unrestricted-SMS treatment group, respectively. Vertical axis 
measures the proportion of individuals with jobs.
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Figure 1 Profile of working status over time by treatment status labor-market intermediation program,
Lima 2009–2010.
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kers, Panel B reports the intent-to-treat parameters following equation (2). Relative to
the control group, the traditional treatment group (DT1) shows positive but not signifi-
cant treatment effects in months one (3.4 percentage points) and two (4 percentage
points). On the contrary, the digital channel seems to explain the overall significant im-
pacts we found for the public intermediation system. By looking closely at rows 3 and 4
in Table 4, one realizes that within the digital channel is the unrestricted-SMS treat-
ment group (DT3), which shows the strongest impacts in month one (8 percentage
points) and month two (7 percentage points), both statistically significant at the 5 and
10 percent level, respectively. The magnitude of these impacts is equivalent to a slightly
above 20 percent increase with respect to the baseline measure of employment. The
restricted-SMS treatment group (DT2), on the other hand, generally has weaker impacts
and it is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level in month one, while in
month two it loses statistical significance. The p-value of the F-test, however, does not
reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. In month 3, no (statistically) significant
effects are found for all individual groups. These findings are robust to the inclusion of
a rich set of socio-demographic and labor-market baseline characteristics as well as the
inclusion of experimental date fixed effects and clustered standard errors.
How can one explain these differential results in months one and two? According
to information theory, the value of information is determined by three important fac-
tors—novelty, confidence, and ability and willingness to act based on the new infor-
mation—all of which involve different forces and trade-offs (Hirshleifer and Riley
1992). In our view, the distinctiveness between restricted [public] and unrestricted
[public/private] information sets involves a novelty factor since historically the standard
public intermediation system has operated only with information from a limited group of
low-quality firms. Thus, individuals in the unrestricted-SMS treatment group received, on
average, not only more information but also qualitatively different information coming
from firms that do not normally register with the public system, all of which makes more
valuable the information received. Put differently, it is the value of the information gener-
ated by the novelty of the information, along the higher number of SMS received by job-
seekers, which might explain the positive impacts on employment.
It is important to highlight that expanding the information set does not automatically
translated into “better” outcomes since more information is not necessarily more valu-
able, all else held constant. One needs to recall that the typical user of the public labor
market intermediation has above-average problems of employability, and therefore they
could have developed strong initial beliefs about the value of the information, a genuine
distrust of information coming from public sources, or both. If that is the case, they
might not believe in the information or act automatically in response to more informa-
tion. Evidence from behavioral economics, for example, suggests that individuals with
poor past experiences have difficulty interpreting subsequent new information, ignore
new information altogether or misread it as initial information expectations tend to an-
chor one’s processing of information (Griffin and Tversky, 1992).
In sum, these findings suggest the unrestricted-SMS treatment group shows the lar-
gest employment impacts within the first two months of the intervention. Yet, we ac-
knowledge that the relative small sample sizes of the two digital treatment groups
prevent us from getting a clearer picture on the relative impacts of each treatment.
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In this section, we analyze heterogeneous treatment impacts across three policy-
relevant variables of interest: labor-market attachment, gender, and poverty status of
participants. This analysis focuses on differential impacts represented by the estimated
coefficient of the interaction term between the overall treatment and the covariates of
interest. We do not focus on particular treatments, i.e., digital versus non-digital, since
it might be asking too much from the data given the sample sizes.
First, we address whether the public intermediation system has differential employment
impacts depending on participants’ attachment to the labor market. This is policy relevant
since adult jobseekers who have never worked are the most prone to fill the ranks of the
inactive population for whom information on job opportunities might be irrelevant. We
define two discrete variables of interest: ‘ever worked’, which is defined as 1 for those who
have worked in the past, 0 otherwise; and ‘full-time status’, which is defined as 1 for those
who had worked full-time in the past (at least 40 hours per week), 0 otherwise. The results
shown in Table 5 reveal statistically significant differential impacts by work experience.
Jobseekers who have ever worked in the past show a 16 percentage points difference in
month one with respect to those who have never worked. Likewise, those who had worked
as full-time workers show a differential impact (20 percentage points) relative to non-full
time workers one month after labor market intermediation. No significant heterogeneous
impacts were found for months two or three, however. These results reveal that a lack of
labor-market experience constitutes a resilient barrier that is difficult to overcome by pub-
lic labor-market intermediation.
Next, we assess the gender dimension as a body of empirical evidence has shown strong
gender gaps against women in the Peruvian market place (e.g., Ñopo 2012). The results re-
ported in Panel C in Table 5 show negligible and insignificant differential impacts by gen-
der. From a policy standpoint, this suggestive result shows that the public intermediation
system is not reproducing inequalities against women in the marketplace.
We also analyze whether public labor-market intermediation show differential im-
pacts by economic status. For that purpose, we constructed a poverty index based on
more than 15 variables related to house infrastructure (e.g., access to toilet, sewage)
and household assets (e.g., computer, car) after combining the data using factor ana-
lytic methods. This continuous poverty index represents a proxy for long-run eco-
nomic status. We use this index to define three categories: poor (first quartile),
middle (second and third quartile), and high (fourth quartile). Results reported in
Panel D of Table 5 show for all interaction terms statistically insignificant effects
across all treatment months. The lack of differential impacts by economic status sug-
gests that those who are most in need do not benefit more from the public intermedi-
ation system.
Additional analyses also consider heterogeneity by education, migration status, and
marital status. No statistically significant differential impacts emerge from them either.6.3 Job-matching efficiency: earnings effects
The power of labor intermediation on matching efficiency has been discussed in the lit-
erature since it is expected that efficiency gains are associated with formal intermedi-
ation mechanisms that have the power to break down traditional networks and
Table 5 Heterogenous impacts. Labor-Market Intermediation Program, Lima 2009-2010
Month # 1 Month # 2 Month # 3
dep. var: employment
Panel A: work experience
Intermediation −0.066 −0.073 0.052 0.072 −0.023 −0.016
(0.076) (0.087) (0.075) (0.078) (0.075) (0.075)
Intermediation*work ever 0.165** 0.165* 0.008 −0.020 0.035 0.016
(0.084) (0.095) (0.083) (0.089) (0.082) (0.078)
Panel B: full-time worker
Intermediation 0.011 0.046 0.033 0.024 −0.017 −0.026
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037)
Intermediation*full time 0.185*** 0.205** 0.069 0.104 0.058 0.077
(0.071) (0.082) (0.070) (0.082) (0.069) (0.067)
Panel C: gender
Intermediation 0.052 0.058 0.025 0.043 −0.011 0.001
(0.047) (0.043) (0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046)
Intermediation*men 0.019 0.007 0.052 0.022 0.022 −0.007
(0.065) (0.066) (0.064) (0.068) (0.063) (0.070)
Panel D: economic status
Middle −0.005 −0.020 0.014 0.013 −0.020 −0.028
(0.074) (0.091) (0.073) (0.088) (0.072) (0.077)
High 0.029 −0.028 −0.019 −0.013 −0.107 −0.089
(0.078) (0.087) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.074)
Intermediation*poor 0.054 0.053 0.061 0.064 −0.012 −0.019
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
Intermediation*middle 0.067 0.074 0.011 0.023 −0.004 0.017
(0.077) (0.083) (0.076) (0.080) (0.076) (0.074)
Intermediation*high 0.113 0.091 0.093 0.059 0.086 0.052
(0.083) (0.077) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.085)
p-value of F-test for equality of coeff 0.819 0.915 0.750 0.914 0.546 0.691
N 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118
Covariates no yes no yes no yes
Experimental groups FE no yes no yes no yes
Notes: Clustered standard errrors in parenthesis. Estimates based on a parametric cross-sectional estimator. The treatment
indicator takes the value 1 for those benefiting from labor-market intermediation, 0 otherwise. Control variables are the same
as those included in Table 3. ***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%.
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stance, found that the monthly wages of graduates from universities that had a job
board for their graduates increased by 3 percent compared to those who did not. In-
spired by this line of inquiry, and to separate wage impacts from employment effects,
we define as a new outcome variable the conditional monthly earnings, which is de-
fined over the subsample of individuals who are successful in getting a job. Thus, inter-
pretation of the point estimates should be done conditional on employment. Row 1 in
Table 6 shows the overall earnings impacts of public intermediation, while rows 2–5 re-
port the estimates for each one of the treatment groups relative to the control group.
Table 6 Labor-market intermediation on job matching efficiency. Labor-Market
Intermediation Program, Lima 2009–2010
Month # 1 Month # 2 Month # 3
Overall treatment 4 −10 28 11 34 16
(28) (27) (26) (24) (26) (24)
Type of treatment
Traditional treatement (DT1) 31 −6 36 0 42 13
(34) (35) (31) (32) (32) (33)
Restricted-SMS treatment (DT2) −45 −44 −12 −4 5 −1
(39) (41) (37) (37) (36) (41)
Unrestricted-SMS treatment (DT3) 6 5 44 33 44 30
(34) (34) (32) (30) (32) (28)
p-value of F-test: DT1 = DT2 = DT3 0.148 0.496 0.290 0.621 0.512 0.745
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Experimental groups FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errrors in parenthesis. Estimates based on a parametric cross-sectional estimator conditional on working
status. The treatment indicator takes the value 1 for those benefiting from labor-market intermediation, 0 otherwise.
Control covariates are the same as those included in Table 4. Clustered standard errors by day are considered when including
experimental group fixed effects in columns 2, 4, and 6.***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%,
*statistically significant at 10%.
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crease overtime, which suggest that those who got jobs in the first month of treatment
have lower reservation wages than those who got jobs later on. This result is consistent
with standard predictions of theoretical job search models (e.g. Mortensen 1986). How-
ever, these point estimates are not statistically significant, and thus they should be taken
only as suggestive evidence. Secondly, across all three months following treatment, the
unrestricted-SMS treatment group shows the largest earnings impacts (30 soles, or 22 per-
cent of the baseline earnings), while the restricted-SMS treatment group shows the lowest.
This suggestive evidence reinforces the previous discussion about the importance of the
extent and scope of the information sets in labor-market intermediation, since they seem
to be more relevant than the information channel itself. The availability of a larger dataset
or lengthier treatment duration would have helped us to provide more definitive results.
From an international perspective, the empirical literature shows ambiguous effects for
LMIs on matching efficiency, with some studies showing positive impacts on earnings
(e.g., Bagues and Sylos 2009) and others a zero effect (e.g., Kroft and Pope 2009).
One caveat with the estimation of job-matching treatment effects conditional on em-
ployment status is the possibility that these results are biased because we observe wages
only for the employed and an individual’s employment status depends on her experimen-
tal status as well as other observed and unobserved characteristics (e.g., Ham and Lalonde
1996). We assessed this potential problem by comparing observed characteristics of treat-
ment and control units who found employment within three months of their eligibility in
this program. We do not observe statistically significant differences across a rich set of co-
variates between these groups, and, therefore, it is not likely that treatment status is corre-
lated with unobserved factors in the sample of employed individuals. Alternatively, we
directly assessed selection bias that arises from the fact that different individuals may non-
randomly choose to work in response to labor-market intermediation by implementing
the well-known two-stage least squares model (Heckman 1979). We use the randomized
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treatment groups into one15. The main findings regarding the lack of matching efficiency
gains hold, and most importantly, the inverse Mills ratio is not statistically significant,
suggesting that employment status is not correlated with unobservables in the sample of
employed persons.6.4 Impacts on additional intermediate outcomes
Motivated by the correlation between Internet and mobile-phone search channels un-
covered in section 5, we analyze the causal impacts of digital labor-market intermedi-
ation on Internet-based search effort at the extensive and intensive margins. Two
variables of interest are captured for the full sample: internet-based job search (1 for
those who have used the Internet for search purposes within the three months follow-
ing labor-market intermediation, 0 otherwise), and weekly hours of internet-based job
search. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 report the results. One observes an overall positive
statistical relationship between labor market intermediation and Internet-based job
search. On average, individuals receiving labor-market intermediation show 6.2 per-
centage points increases (10 percent increase) and 0.26 more weekly hours (11 percent
increase) of Internet-based job searching relative to the control group, both statistically
significant at the 10 and 5 percent levels. Importantly, these results are mainly lead by
the unrestricted-SMS treatment group. On average, this particular treatment lead to an
increase of 7.9 percentage points and 0.33 more weekly hours of Internet-based search,
both statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The non-digital and restricted-SMS
treatment groups also show positive point estimates, although they are not statistically
significantly different from zero. The resulting p-value of the F-test of equality of pa-
rameters among the treatment groups does not reject the null hypothesis.
To check whether digital labor-market intermediation led to crowding-out effects of
traditional search channels, we analyze the causal impacts of digital intermediation on
newspaper ads, friends and family referrals, among other traditional search channels,
using the same parametric framework yet estimated over the sample of unemployed indi-
viduals at the time of the survey16. The results reported in column 3 in Table 7 show no
evidence in this regard. The intent-to-treat parameters are not statistically significantly
different from zero for all treatment groups. In contrast to evidence from developed coun-
tries that show how the lengthy penetration of Internet has led to a reallocation of search
effort among various job search activities (Stevenson 2009, Kuhn and Mansour 2011), we
do not find similar evidence for our short-length digital treatment intervention.7 Conclusion
This study exploits a multi-treatment experimental design implemented as part of the
regular (non-experimental) public intermediation system in Peru to investigate the ex-
tent to which public labor-market intermediation influences employment and job
matching efficiency. Particular attention was given to investigate the interaction be-
tween the speed (digital/non-digital channels) and the scope of information (restricted/
unrestricted sets), given countervailing forces emerging from standard theoretical em-
ployment search models. We show that public labor-market intermediation causes
positive and statistically significant short-run employment impacts. This positive effect,
Table 7 Impact of labor-market intermediation on other intermediate outcomes.
Labor-Market Intermediation Program, Lima 2009-2010
Internet-based Weekly hours Traditional job
Job search Internet search Search
Overall treatment 0.062* 0.264** −0.024
(0.032) (0.130) (0.049)
Type of treatment
Traditional treatment (DT1) 0.049 0.241 −0.007
(0.038) (0.160) (0.065)
Restricted-SMS treatment (DT2) 0.056 0.186 −0.005
(0.046) (0.172) (0.094)
Unrestricted-SMS treatment (DT3) 0.079* 0.336* −0.054
(0.042) (0.202) (0.082)
p-value of F-test: DT1 = DT2 = DT3 0.765 0.792 0.678
N 1140 1140 517
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Experimental groups FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered standard errrors in parenthesis. Estimates based on a parametric cross-sectional estimator. Internet-based
search outcome is captured for the full sample, and it is defined as 1 for those who have used the Internet within the three
months of labor-market intermediation, 0 otherwise. Traditional job search and job expectations outcomes are captured only
for the unemployed at the time of the follow-up interview. Control covariates are the same as those included in Table 4.
***statistically significant at 1%, **statistically significant at 5%, *statistically significant at 10%.
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labor-market intermediation for the control group.
An important finding reported in this study is that, in the labor market, the scope
and novelty of the information travelling through digital means seems to be import-
ant. While the impacts from traditional intermediation are not large enough to be
statistically significant, the unrestricted–SMS treatment group shows statistically
significant employment effects in the first two months following the intervention.
Although the differential impacts among treatment groups are not sufficiently large
to be statistically detected, the results suggest that integrating mobile phone tech-
nologies into traditional, public labor-market intermediation and extending the set
of information available for jobseekers can constitute a cost-effective labor-market
initiative as the marginal costs of providing SMS information are low. As for poten-
tial matching efficiency gains, the results suggest no statistically significant effects
associated with information channels or sets. Overall, these results suggest weaker
impacts for SMS technologies in the labor market relative to previous studies that
mainly focused on agricultural markets and outputs. We acknowledge that our sam-
ple represents a particular subset of the unemployed population, so external validity
of the findings should be taken with caution.
From a policy standpoint, this research shows the feasibility and value of integrat-
ing new information technologies into the old, traditional labor-market intermedi-
ation services. That is perhaps the main policy contribution of this research as it
highlights how traditional LMIs can take advantage of the rapid expansion of mobile
phone technologies and catch themselves up by using SMS applications as a delivery
platform. A particular lesson emerging from this study is that the Peruvian public
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on a limited set of firms that have previously signed up to the system is relaxed. In this
regard, jobseekers could benefit more if the public LMI operator also incorporates in-
formation generated outside the system, such as from online job boards and newspa-
pers ads. Particular attention should be given to those who lack labor-market
experience since the results show that this particular group benefits the least from
public labor-market intermediation and disproportionally uses the Internet and cell
phones less for job search purposes.
Endnotes
1Peru’s mobile infrastructure reached a substantial coverage of 101 mobile phone
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, with 79 percent of them classified as prepaid sub-
scriptions in 2010 World Bank (2012).
2The duration of unemployment for jobseekers using the public employment services
was around 11 weeks, while for those using other job search strategies was 7 weeks.
3The information collected from jobseekers include standard demographic variables,
schooling, training participation, computing knowledge, foreign-language knowledge,
driver’s license, labor market experience, and current labor-market situation. Firms pro-
vide contact information (address, contact name, telephone, location, etc.), detailed de-
scription of the job vacancy (work schedules, salary, location, main responsibilities and
tasks), and job requirements (education, experience, computing and language know-
ledge, years of experience, driver’s license).
4A common practice for private employment agencies in Peru is to charge each
worker half of the monthly salary they would receive in the new job.
5The service is free and accessible to anyone with a computer at http://
www.empleosperu.gob.pe.
6It is estimated that 34 percent of registered jobseekers make use of this electronic
version of the program (MTPS 2006).
7Thomas (1997), for example, shows that the positive relationship between public
employment services use and unemployment spell duration is biased because of the
lack of control for the timing of unemployment.
8The matching algorithm was able to map specific job requirements (e.g., gender, age,
schooling level, prior experience, and skills) to individuals’ profiles.
9According to a 2003 survey of formal firms located in metropolitan Lima, advertise-
ment of job vacancies is mainly done via newspaper ads (54 percent).
10A (fictitious) reproduction of an SMS message says: “PROEMPLEO. Hostess wanted
Restaurant Amador. Av. La Mar #3453 Lince Tel 3038145. Contact”.
11Attrition is not driven by specific drop-out patterns of low- or high-quality jobsee-
kers. Rather it mainly reflects the inability of surveyors to find respondents in their
homes during the survey visits.
12This table is available upon request.
13An alternative option would be to implement a standard parametric difference-in-
differences model. Yet, the employment outcome in the baseline period refers to the
week of reference, while the follow-up data captures monthly employment for each one
the first months following treatment. One should not expect, however, to have different
results given the strong balance in outcomes and covariates in the baseline period.
Dammert et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:11 Page 24 of 2714The experimental point estimates are modest compared to non-experimental evidence
presented by Chacaltana and Sulmont (2013) in their analysis of earlier cohorts participat-
ing in the CIL-PROEMPLEO program. These authors used a sample of 153 individuals
that were successfully intermediated in April 2001 as the treatment group. The compari-
son group comes from a representative employment survey from which 275 nonpartici-
pant individuals, who were unemployed in April 2001, were drawn. Some outcomes of
interest were measured and compared one year later using standard parametric matching
techniques. The authors show large and significant gains in wages and employment for
the treatment group, relative to the control one, one year later.
15Given that both earnings and employment are endogenous variables, with only one
IV, we are still identifying off of the functional form.
16In contrast to the Internet-based outcome, traditional search methods in the fol-
low–up survey were asked only for the week of reference and only to the subsample of
unemployed people.
17We do not make any assumption regarding the distributions functions F1 and F2 .
Appendix: Some theoretical considerations
We present in this section a (marginal) extension of a standard job-search model with en-
dogenous search intensity (Mortensen 1986) to illustrate the theoretical effects of policies
that aim at changing the rate at which jobseekers are informed about job openings on
search intensity and exit rate from unemployment. Previous related literature has studied
the effect of job offer arrival rates on the exit rate from unemployment in the context of
constant individual search effort and a single job search channel. For this particular case,
van den Berg (1994) shows minimal conditions on the wage offer distribution that ensure
a positive effect on the exit rate associated with an increase in the job offer arrival rate.
Fougère et al. (2009) extended the model by considering two channels of job-search, pub-
lic and private, with endogenous search effort only along the private channel. Results from
this model suggest that an increase in the public job offer arrival rate has only a positive
effect on the exit rate as long as the wage offer distributions in both channels are assumed
to be identical; otherwise, the direction of the effect is ambiguous.
We extended the model by considering two job search channels, public and private,
with endogenous search efforts in both search channels. In contrast to Fougère et al.
(2009), we consider that the job offer arrival rate via the public channel to be endogenous
since the features of the public labor intermediation services we are studying suggest that
individuals need to allocate a complementary search effort to make effective a job offer. In
this study, the job offer arrival rate depends on the individual’s search effort, the type of
technology employed by the public labor mediation services, and the set of information
used to match individuals to jobs. We consider an unemployed individual who does not
receive any UI benefits and is actively searching for a job using both private and public
labor intermediation services. Unemployed individuals using public intermediation ser-
vices are contacted and informed about job openings according to a Poisson process with
endogenous rate s1λ1(τ, ξ) that depends on the search intensity effort s1 and the overall
channel-specific search efficiency λ1, which in turn depends on the technology used to
convey the information τ and the set of information employed to match job openings ξ.
We assume that the overall channel-specific search efficiency level can be improved with
information communication technologies λ1,τ > 0 and by employing a broader set of
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fective job offers is defined as q1s1λ1(τ, ξ), where q1 is the probability that a job contact via
public mediation service leads to a job offer.
Likewise, unemployed individuals using private job-search methods are informed
about job openings at rate s2λ2, which depends on the search intensity effort s2 and
an overall constant channel-specific search efficiency level λ2. The arrival rate of ef-
fective job offers is defined as q2s2λ2 where q2 is the probability that a job contact
via private job-search leads to an effective job offer. Job offers along these two chan-
nels of search are characterized as random draws from wage offer distributions
F1(w) and F2(w), respectively
17. Search intensity effort is costly and can be summarized by
the cost function c(s1, s2) with increasing and convex arguments such that csi > 0; csisi > 0;
csisj > 0; csisi csisj−c
2
sisj > 0 . In the absence of UI benefits, as is the case here, let z be the
value of leisure and r the discount rate. An optimal search strategy is a choice of an inten-
sity of search effort and reservation wage w*. Let U and W(w) denote the present
discounted value of income when unemployed and employed, respectively. The present-
discounted value from unemployment U satisfies the bellman equation
rU ¼ Max
s1;s2≥0
z−c s1; s2ð Þ þ q1s1λ1 τ; ξð Þ
Z∞
0
max 0;W 1 xð Þ−U½ dF1 xð Þ þ q2s2λ2
Z∞
0
max 0;W 2 xð Þ−U½ dF2 xð Þ
2
4
3
5
ð3Þ
By applying the reservation wage property U =W(w*) = w*/r to equation (1), we canstate that the reservation wage, w*, is the solution to
w ¼ Max
s1;s2≥0
z−c s1; s2ð Þ þ q1s1λ1 τ; ξð Þr
Z∞
w
x−wð ÞdF1 xð Þþ q2s2λ2r
Z∞
w
x−wð ÞdF2 xð Þ
2
4
3
5
ð4Þ
The first order conditions for optimal search intensity efforts s and s equate the1 2
marginal return and cost, and can be written as
s1 : −cs1 þ
q1λ1 τ; ξð Þ
r
Z∞
w
x−wð ÞdF1 xð Þ ¼ 0
s2 : −cs2 þ
q2λ2
r
Z∞
w
x−wð ÞdF2 xð Þ ¼ 0 g ð5Þ
The exit rate from unemployment for an individual that uses public labor inter-
mediation services as well as alternative private job-search methods is defined as
γ ¼ q1s1λ1 τ; ξð Þ 1−F1 wð Þ½  þ q2s2λ2 1−F2 wð Þ½  ð6Þ
The theoretical effect of policies that may affect the rate at which unemployed indi-
viduals are informed about job openings (e.g., SMS technology) on the exit rate from
unemployment is defined as
dγ
dτ
¼ λ1 τ; ξð Þa1 ∂s1∂τ þ s1a1
∂λ1 τ; ξð Þ
∂τ
þ λ2a2 ∂s2∂τ þ s1λ1 τ; ξð Þ
∂a1
∂w
þ s2λ2 ∂a2∂w
 
∂w
∂τ
; ð7Þ
Dammert et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:11 Page 26 of 27where ai = qi[1 − Fi(w*)]. By construction, we know that the overall search efficiency
level λ1 can be improved by information technology (e.g., SMS) used to convey in-
formation on job opportunities to unemployed individuals ∂λ1(τ, ξ)/∂τ > 0. Then, a
comparative static exercise (available under request) suggest that the search effort
allocated to the public job-search channel increases with the technology that im-
proves the rate at which unemployed individuals are contacted and informed about
job openings, ∂s1/∂τ > 0.
The intuition for this result suggest that as long as the SMS technology improves
the overall search efficiency in the public search channel, those using this channel
will tend to allocate higher search efforts to it. Conversely, it is expected that indi-
viduals’ search efforts allocated to alternative private search channels will be
crowed-out since ∂s2/∂τ < 0. Further, as the technology improves the rate at which
individuals are informed about job openings, we expect a more patient unemployed
individual waiting to consider a better wage offer, as the increase in the reservation
wage suggest, ∂w*/∂τ > 0. Hence, the sign of expression (5) is uncertain and clearly
hinges on the magnitudes of the reservation wage response to policy and the
crowding-out effect on private job-search effort. This uncertainty only has been re-
solved in models with a single job-search channel and a constant job offer arrival rate
(van den Berg, 1994) or models with two job-search channels and an endogenous job
offer arrival rate in only one channel (Fougère et al. 2009). Yet here, with endogenous
job offer arrival rates in both search channels, finding conditions to tell the direction
of expression (SS5) is not clear. Therefore, we have to turn to an empirical approach
to gain additional insights.Competing interests
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